An assessment of the application of LEGS in FAO – funded emergency pastoral interventions in Kenya

Yacob Aklilu
VETWORK UK, on behalf of LEGS
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Acronyms

AHA	Animal Health Assistant
ALRMP	Arid Land Resources Management Project
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CBPP	Contagious bovine pleuroneumonia
CCPP	Contagious caprine pleuroneumonia
CERF	Central Emergency Relief Fund
CODES	Community Organisation for Development Support
DLPO	District Livestock Production Officer
DMO	Drought Management Officer
DPHO	District Public Health Officer
DSG	District Steering Group
DVO	District Veterinary Officer/s
ECHO	European Coordination for Humanitarian Office
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation (Kenya)
KEVEVAPI	Kenya Veterinary Vaccine Production Institute
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards
LSD	Lumpy Skin Disease
BQ	Black Quarter
LOA	Letter of Agreement
NGO	Non- governmental Organisation
PPR	Peste de petit ruminant
PRIM	Participatory Response Identification Matrix
RVF	Rift Valley fever
VSF-B	Veterinaires san Frontieres - Belgium
VEA	Vetworks East Africa

Summary

One outcome of the lessons documented from the 1999-2000 emergency interventions in pastoral areas of Kenya was increased awareness of the need to develop standards and guidelines in emergency operations for the livestock sub-sector. Subsequently, in 2004 OFDA funded an initiative to develop livestock standards similar to the SPHERE standards for humanitarian assistance. Further funding from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), OXFAM GB, and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2006 allowed a steering group to be formed and for first drafts of the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) to be written. The initial steering group consisted of VSF-Belgium, Tufts University, African Union/Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU/DREA), FAO and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and LEGS drafting, training and manual translation are coordinated and managed by Vetwork UK. The first edition of LEGS was published in 2009.

Admittedly, it is only a year and half since LEGS was launched for the concept to be fully applied in all livestock –based emergency interventions in the region or elsewhere. Regardless, despite its availability on the web, book and CD formats and given that much of the field case studies and practices were drawn from Eastern Africa, it appears that the dissemination rate in Kenya, where this assessment took place, appears to be rather low. For example, during the course of this assessment, none of the key regional government staff in Kenya that were involved in the coordination and / or implementation of projects assessed were familiar with LEGS, excepting Arid Lands Resource Management Programme (ALRMP) staff in Garissa. Not surprisingly, of the three Non Governmental Organizations (NGO)s included in this assessment as well, only one staff member was trained on LEGS in Addis Ababa. The familiarity of the other NGO staff members with LEGS was varied and this is reflected in the design and implementation modalities of the projects assessed. That this is happening in Kenya, the inception point for LEGS, demonstrates the urgency to embarking on a *series of in-country trainings* to enhance the wider dissemination and application of LEGS (in addition to the ones conducted by the LEGS Coordination Unit in different countries).

What needs to be understood, in this regard, is that relevant government employees (veterinarians, water engineers, livestock production and public health officers, emergency coordinators, etc.) are equally, if not more, important as NGO employees either in coordinating or implementing emergency responses. They can also be influential on how operations should be conducted. More importantly, the appropriate application of LEGS is first and foremost dependant on the availability of real time funding by donor agencies. Regional level trainings conducted by the Coordination Unit, therefore, need to focus on **donor** agencies in addition to relevant national government staff and senior NGO personnel for timely funding and the adoption of LEGS as a policy. National level trainings (by FAO and other agencies) should be aimed at balancing the right mix of employees from government agencies, NGOs, Community-based Organizations (CBO) and other civic organisations to enhance its practical application during operations.

As a rights and livelihood based approach, LEGS standards are set high relative to field realities. Its' effectiveness as an assessment tool is to some extent limited by this fact. For example, one of major bottleneck is that funding comes too late for effective and timely interventions. Rectifying this constraint is beyond the capacity of implementing agencies or third parties through which funding is channelled. Third parties (such as Central Emergency Relief Fund or CERF, FAO etc.), could also be as lengthy and as bureaucratic in releasing funds or essential inputs for emergency responses on time.

Similarly, implementation speed and modality is also affected by operational and administrative procedures of partner entities in operations that require technical and other sorts of co-ordinations between various agencies. LEGS focuses more on the importance of coordination between agencies but is short on pointing out that partnerships can also affect the implementation process.

Two of the objectives of this paper are to gauge if the common and specific standards can be used for ranking and the reason why agencies did not follow the LEGS methodology (if any) in both the design and implementation phases. In the first case, our finding is that there are too many indicators to be used for ranking (see annex II-V). In the case of the latter, it is because agencies (government staff in particular) are not familiar with LEGS. This reaffirms the need for a series of in-country trainings, which could be run by agencies with permanent representation offices like FAO. However, FAO needs to change some of its current practices before embarking on conducting trainings on LEGS (such as in providing necessary emergency response inputs on time).

This report is the first of its kind in using LEGS as an assessment tool since it was launched in 2009. It was found that field officers of NGOs perceived LEGS as an essential manual for response design and implementation, even if they had not received LEGS training. It was found that the application of LEGS was compromised partly because there were on-going projects that the intervention funding supported. However, interventions incorporated LEGS standards, which facilitated streamlining project activities.

Regarding evaluation, a LEGS common standard, our conclusion is that LEGS can be used as an assessment tool in many but not in all cases because of too many indicators and high sets of standards. It was found that LEGS indicators are too unwieldy for scoring purposes since there are too many indicators in both the common and specific standards This necessitates developing a *separate assessment template* that reflects field realities for evaluation purposes although this may entail compromising some of the standards. Regardless, this assessment was helpful in identifying lessons for LEGS in the following areas (details are provided in section 10 of this report):

- That restocking operations in pastoral areas should take into account income from non-livestock sources when determining the number of stock to be given to households rather than on 'viable herd size'. Similarly, beneficiary households need to be selected on the basis of income not only from livestock sources but also from non-livestock sources through community consultations.
- The benefits derived from selling animals for restocking interventions is likely to be skewed to those offering young and healthy breeding stock for sale. Poor pastoralists may not benefit in such cases.
- Appropriate procedures on carcass disposal and removal need to be included in revised editions of LEGS.
- There is a need to recognise the complexity of targeting in times of mass vaccinations and treatments in circumstances where available drugs and vaccines can't cover operational areas.
- Commitment to staying in the home area should be the basis for selection of Community-based Animal Health Workers (CAHW) in addition to other criteria.
- Program flexibility should be built in revised editions of LEGS to allow implementing agencies to switch between interventions as circumstances (climatic or others) dictate.

- Apparent differences exist between pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. Agro-pastoral households raise livestock mainly for profit and take the initiative to dispose animals in the market in times of stress. This implies that destocking operations are readily acceptable in agro-pastoral communities compared to pastoralists. Women in agro-pastoral households also derive most of their income from raising chickens. Emergency veterinary and livestock provisions, therefore, should look into the inclusion of chickens in such situations.
- Seasonal or other mobility involving the transportation of goods can't take place without donkeys or camels. Yet, they are often excluded from emergency veterinary service provisions, as was demonstrated in Garissa, Samburu and Chemolingot, the exception being Kitui and Makueni. Due attention need to be given to donkeys and camels when planning veterinary interventions, without which mobility will be severely restricted. Remember the Afghan proverb that, 'A man without a donkey is a donkey', as he has to carry everything.

1. Introduction

A Letter of Agreement (LoA) was signed between FAO Kenya and Vetwork UK in which the latter was assigned to undertake an assessment of emergency interventions funded through the FAO (CERF) programme in pastoral areas of Kenya during the 2009 drought. The LoA stipulated the assessment of eight specific interventions being implemented by four partner agencies in two phases.

The first phase of the assessment took place between 7 and 23rd March, 2010, focusing on the activities of VSF-Belgium in Garissa and Chemolingot and that of Community Organization for Development Support (CODES) in Samburu. The second assessment, involving VETWORKS EAST AFRICA's (VEA) activities, was carried out between the 22nd and the 25th of June 2010 in Greater Makueni and Kitui Districts.

Eight specific interventions involving the three agencies were assessed in total. Four of these focus on animal health interventions mainly because some of the planned activities, such as feed provision in Turkana, Samburu and Chemlongot and water provision in Garissa and Chemolingot, were either not implemented during the time of the assessment or postponed for various reasons. The circumstances in the field have admittedly shifted the focus of the assessment towards animal health interventions compared to other activities rather than intent.

2. Objectives

The main objective of this assessment is aimed at using common and specific standards of the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) as the criteria to find out:

- *If agencies follow the LEGS standards and if not why not?*
- *If the use of LEGS led to appropriate project design and implementation, and ultimately, relevant livelihoods benefits to targeted communities and households?'*
- *What revisions to future editions of LEGS might be needed based on these findings?*

This assessment is also intended to include comments on the likely impact of the specific interventions through systematic impact assessments based on representative samples or interviews with project beneficiaries. For more detail, see Annex I – Terms of Reference.

3. Methodology

Both secondary and primary data sources were used for this assessment. Secondary data sources consisted of proposals submitted to FAO and correspondences between the parties involved. These sources were used to assess adherence to the LEGS guidelines (assessment methods, timing and appropriateness of interventions).

Primary data sources were collected through focus group interviews from beneficiary communities in Garissa, Samburu and Chemolingot, Makueni and Kitui districts[1] to obtain information on the roles of communities (from needs assessment to implementation phases); in the ranking of benefits derived; and in assessing strengths and weaknesses of the specific intervention from community perspectives to assess conformity with and draw lessons for LEGS. A focus group interview was also held with a community group (at Doloi Midi, in Garissa district) that has not benefitted from any intervention at all to obtain insight and draw lessons (that can be of interest to LEGS) as to how this community survived the drought without any external assistance.

Further interviews were held with relevant government office bearers (district drought Management, veterinary, livestock production and public health Officers) that were involved in situation assessment, implementation and / or coordination roles in the respective operational areas. In-depth discussions were also held with the implementing agencies (VSF-B, CODES and VEA) on the procedures followed from needs assessment to implementation phases.

4. Types of interventions funded by FAO in four operational areas

Table 1. Interventions funded by FAO in four operational areas

Agency	Types of intervention	Activities undertaken	Location
VSF Belgium	Destocking*	200 shoats purchased for slaughter each at a price of 1,500 KSh from 200 HHs; 600 HHs received meat	Raya, Garissa
	Animal health*	RVF vaccine and deworming CCPP and PPR vaccination and deworming and treatments	Raya, Garissa Kostei, East Pokot
	Carcass disposal*	Disposal of 76 cattle and shoats carcasses in 10 sites	Chemolingot, East Pokot
	Water development	1 well rehabilitated	Chemolingot, East Pokot
	Feed provision	1,500 bales purchased, only few bales distributed in three centres	Akoret location, East Pokot
CODES	Destocking*	100 shoats purchased at a price of 1,000 Ksh each; 100 HHs received meat	Lulu, Samburu
	Restocking*	23 HHs restocked each with 10 goats	Lulu, Samburu
	Animal health*	De-worming and other treatments for shoats	Lulu, Samburu
	Fodder production	Not yet started	Samburu

[1] Garissa, Samburu and Chemolingot are predominantly pastoral districts; Makueni and Kitui communities are agro-pastoral.

Vetworks EA	Animal health*	LSD, BQ vaccination for cattle, anti-rabies for dogs and CCPP for shoats; de-worming and multivitamins for cattle, shoats and donkeys	Greater Kitui and Makueni districts
	Animal health*	LSD, BQ vaccination for cattle; anti-rabies for dogs; PPR and CCPP for shoats; deworming and multivitamins for cattle, donkeys and shoats	Greater Makueni

*denote assessed interventions

5. Background

5.1 The FAO drought relief interventions

The FAO-financed interventions were designed to support underfunded drought-stricken pastoral areas. As such, agencies that were financed by FAO were already involved in implementing response interventions in their respective operational areas but were unable to meet most of the needs given the severity of the 2009 drought. FAO disbursed $50,000 to each of the agency (8 agencies in total)[2]. However, the funding was made available towards the tail end of the drought and in a number of cases the rains started soon after requiring program flexibility as needs shifted.

Some changes were made to meet shifting needs, for example, from destocking to restocking (in Samburu). In other cases, delays in the implementation of certain types of interventions (fodder production in Samburu, water development in East Pokot) meant that such interventions were not necessary any more as drought response measures or required design change (for example, rehabilitating boreholes instead of shallow wells). Of note, the timing of the interventions, obviously late, need to be viewed from the point of an effort to support underfunded areas in the midst of the drought, rather than as an initiative to intervene in the alert or alarm phase of the drought cycle, as indicated in the following timeline.

Timeline



[2] Veterinary drugs and vaccines were provided by FAO outside of the allocated $50,000 in cases of animal health interventions.

5.2 Background on LEGS

LEGS is aimed at NGOs, donors and governments involved in emergency operations in areas where primary or secondary source of income is derived from livestock. As a policy tool, 'it is also aimed at donors and governments whose funding and implementation decisions impact on disaster response'. Similar in design and concept to SPHERE, LEGS promotes a rights-based approach, such as rights to food and the right to a standard of living - in other words, the right to protection of livelihoods. LEGS is composed of nine chapters. The first three chapters focus on cross-cutting issues and include eight common standards that need to be applied in the six specific standards. Three approaches are employed for the dissemination and wider application of LEGS. It is available on the web[3] for downloading and also in a book and CD format. The third approach involves training of trainers (ToT). Since the launching of the book, four regional trainings were conducted in Addis Ababa, Cambodia, Nairobi and Nepal comprising a mix of practitioners from NGOs, FAO, UNDP, UN-OCHA and independent consultants and government. There are plans to conduct further regional trainings in South/West Africa and Pakistan, pending funding availability.

5.3 LEGS common standards and minimum standards

There are eight common standards in LEGS. These are:

- Common standard 1: Participation
- Common standard 2: Initial assessment
- Common standard 3: Response and coordination
- Common standard 4: Targeting
- Common standard 5: Monitoring and evaluation and livelihoods impact
- Common standard 6: Technical support and agency competencies
- Common standard 7: Preparedness, and
- Common standard 8: Advocacy and policy

The six minimum standards include the following:

- Minimum standards for destocking
- Minimum standards for veterinary services
- Minimum standards for ensuring supplies of feed resources
- Minimum standards for the provision of water
- Minimum standards for livestock shelter and settlement
- Minimum standards for livestock provision

Summary of findings

[3] [3] http://www.livestock-emergency.net/

Findings in the following pages are presented in accordance with the common and specific standards to indicate adherence to and variations from the LEGS guideline. Please refer to the LEGS manual[4] for ease of reference.

6. Common standards as applied to the FAO-funded interventions

Participation – In the pastoral districts of Garissa, Chemolingot and Samburu, communities have effectively participated in destocking, restocking, carcass disposal and de-worming and Contagious Caprine Pleuroneumonia (CCPP) vaccination operations in various phases of the intervention process including in this assessment exercise (some details provided in the specific standards). However, in the case of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) vaccination (in Garissa), communities were not even informed of what the vaccination was against (by the respective veterinary bureau). In line with the reservation of pastoralists about the effectiveness of vaccination in times of stress, communities complained of livestock being affected by fever, infertility and abortion following the RVF vaccination, although this could not be verified[5].

Similarly, in the agro-pastoral Makueni and Kitui districts, communities were not informed about the types of vaccines administered to livestock, although the respective District Veterinary Officers (DVO) have communicated this to division and location animal health staff. In these areas, communities seem to be resigned to the fact that veterinary officers know what they are doing while the latter do not see the need to inform communities. Regardless, the vaccinations and the treatments were regarded highly by the communities because the interventions took place in April and May 2010, after the animals have recovered.

Initial assessment – Initial assessment was carried out long before the FAO intervention commenced since the objective of this initiative was to support on-going activities in underfunded areas. Regardless, the initial assessments took place in coordination with the respective ALRMP offices and District steering groups.

For activities like destocking, restocking and carcass removal, there were no specific market / service provision requirements and the available local services were adequate. For animal health provisions, however, the assumption on which the assessment methods were based was short of the reality on the ground (see animal health section for more details).

Water rehabilitation / development interventions also seem to be impacted from assessment inadequacy either in terms of costing, logistical requirements, and short versus long-term solutions due to, admittedly, from shifting needs as the weather changed for the better.

Response and coordination – In all the five districts, the coordination process, between relevant agencies, was properly harmonised. Firstly, the types of responses were discussed and approved at the District Steering Group (DSG) level (chaired by the district administration office and composed of ALRMP, DVO and District Livestock Production Officer and water departments). Secondly, operational areas were demarcated for agencies by the DSG to avoid overlapping. Thirdly, the FAO

[4] http://www.livestock-emergency.net/
[5] Abortion is a recognized technical problem with RVF vaccines

intervention was primarily aimed at providing funding for on-going projects to reinforce the support provided initially by other donor agencies.

Meanwhile, the level of coordination between responses was varied. In Samburu, the switch from destocking to restocking was carried out at the right time after the rains started. However, given that animal health interventions were carried out earlier meant animals purchased for restocking were not vaccinated nor possibly de-wormed. Similarly, animal health interventions in Garissa, Samburu and Chemolingot districts were carried out without complementary feed and water provision due to delays in the implementation of the latter two. In Kitui and Makueni, there was no need for complementary provisions due to the availability of feed and water when the operation eventually took place, much later than it was planned.

Targeting – For destocking and restocking operations (in Garissa and Samburu), communities selected beneficiaries in open meetings based on a set of criteria and in the case of Garissa, the selection process was in addition facilitated by Relief Committees trained by ALRMP. The carcass disposal operation in Chemolingot was primarily and appropriately aimed at removing carcasses from water points to reduce contamination.

Animal health interventions were implemented by district veterinary service (DVS) staff in all areas. Available drugs for treatment, in all cases, were short of actual needs which made appropriate targeting more difficult and the services rendered were limited by the available drugs in the respective operational areas. At least one village, visited by the team, was not covered by the RVF vaccination campaign in Garissa district.

Vaccinations and treatments were provided free of charge in all areas, except in Kitui and Makueni, where communities were charged 30 shilling for anti-rabies vaccine, 20, 5 and 2 shillings respectively for the de-worming of donkeys, cattle and shoats as a cost sharing scheme. Communities agreed that the charges were reasonable. Targeting in Kitui and Makueni districts was carried out by the respective District Veterinary Office (DVO) staff on the basis of agro-pastoral communities hard hit by the drought, but this could be questionable due to changing circumstances given the delay in the implementation process long after the rains[6].

Monitoring and evaluation and livelihood impact – These aspects of the common LEGS standards were incorporated at the program design phase by FAO Kenya. The monitoring process is carried out by FAO Kenya and also by the DSGs in relevant districts. This assessment report, prepared by Vetwork UK, constitutes part of the participatory impact assessment based on the LEGS guidelines from the perspectives of beneficiary communities. The report also intends to draw up useful lessons for field practitioners and revised edition of LEGS in the future.

Technical support and agency competencies – Field level managers and officers of VSF-B, CODES and VEA are experienced enough in managing and coordinating the response interventions. The VSF-B field coordinator in Garissa also had the added advantage of being trained on LEGS methodology in Addis Ababa, while those in Chemolingot (VSF-B) and Samburu (CODES) also admitted that they have somewhat tried to incorporate LEGS in planning and implementation phases[7]. In addition, the

[6] For example, communities comparatively less affected by the drought, for some reason, could be substantially affected by high level of livestock mortalities following the initial rains

[7] By downloading the guideline from the internet

field staff coordinated with and obtained support from relevant technical agencies where they lacked expertise.

In all the five districts, Animal health interventions were coordinated with and implemented by the DVOs. DLPOs were involved in the screening of animals purchased for slaughter and restocking and along with the District Public Health Officer (DPHO) in meat inspection. Again, the DPHO in Chemolingot was actively involved in carcass removal operation. Water rehabilitation / development activities were jointly designed with District water officers. In summary, NGO personnel seem to be aware of LEGS in the general sense; admittedly, they are not familiar with the details. On the other hand, Government staff (DVOs, DLPOs, DPHOs and district water technicians/engineers), that were responsible for implementing the projects, are not totally aware of LEGS in most cases, in part due to limited access to internet services.

Preparedness – As a late intervention to support underfunded areas, this specific project does not lend itself to be assessed in terms of disaster risk reduction, contingency planning and drought cycle management or exit strategies. In fact, the procurement process of FAO was thought by many to be lengthy and bureaucratic delaying the delivery of drugs even after agreements were signed. For example, FAO and VEA signed a Letter of Agreement in September 2009, but the first batch of drugs was delivered to the latter in February 2010 and the second batch in April of the same year (i.e. six to eight months later after the agreement was signed). In truth, the delay was partially attributable to the FAO procurement process as KEVEVAPI failed to supply vaccines despite repeated requests. FAO was finally able to get the vaccine supplies after management changes were made at KEVEVAPI. On the other hand, community preparedness was best observed in Doloi Midi (Garissa), a community that has not received any kind of livestock-related assistance except for irregular food distribution from the Kenya Red Cross once every two or three months, which the community stated they can do without (see box).

Advocacy and policy – This is a long-term process to be covered by this report.

7 Minimum Standards as implemented in the FAO-funded interventions

7.1 *Destocking*

Due to the late intervention, the destocking operation involved slaughter destocking for the distribution of fresh meat in both Samburu and Garissa.

Both operations were small-scale, involving 200 shoats in Garissa and 100 shoats in Samburu (the latter, due to switching to restocking after the rains). Both the purchase and slaughtering of the shoats took place within the villages of beneficiary communities at agreed upon dates. Slaughtering was done in one go in Garissa and in two phases in Samburu.

Because of budget limitation, only shoats (mainly goats) were purchased for slaughter. Purchase prices were well above the market price (according to focus group participants in both sites), at 1,500 shillings per shoat (500 shillings above the market price) in Garissa and at 1,000 shillings in Samburu (400 shillings above the market price). Payment was effected directly to sellers.

Households for receiving meat or selling shoats to the program were selected by the community in open meetings. In Samburu, eligible households for selling goats were selected on the basis of (i) those owning fewer than 10 goats, (ii) families with sick children to attend to, (iii) women with children in school (requiring to paying school fees), or (iv) widows and poor people who have no food. In Raya, Garissa, the majority who sold shoats to the program were women-headed households. In both cases, households were allowed to sell only one goat to the program.

In both Lulu (Samburu) and Raya (Garissa) those who were selected to receive meat were: lactating mothers, sick and old people, and households who couldn't buy food for their children. In Garissa, the distribution of meat was enhanced through the local relief committee.

In Garissa, 200 goats were slaughtered and the meat was given to 600 families. In Samburu, 100 goats were slaughtered and the meat was distributed to 100 families (1 goat per household). However, recipient families shared the meat with neighbours.

Meat inspection was carried out by the DLPO and the DPHO in Garissa. Twenty carcasses were condemned due to emaciation. In Samburu, meat inspection was done by the DPHO and no carcass was rejected.

Slaughtering and meat distribution was carried out by community members in both areas. In Garissa, the proceeds from sale of skins (for 40 shillings each) were used to pay those who slaughtered and skinned the goats. In Samburu, payment for such services was done in animal organs (kidneys, livers, etc) while the skins were given to women groups, who sold them at 50 shillings each and deposited the money in the bank. Some of this money was given to poor families to enable them buy text books for their children while the rest was used for running small businesses belonging to the women groups. Obviously, the destocking process took place too late in the drought cycle (almost at the recovery stage) and in Samburu, the implementing agency was rightly persuaded to use the bulk of the budget instead for restocking.

In a non-related initiative to the FAO intervention, agro-pastoral communities in Makueni and Kitui districts were involved in commercial destocking by selling livestock in the local markets both at the early stages and in the midst of the drought. Average livestock holdings per household in the four communities visited varied between 5 and 10 head of cattle, 20-30 goats, 3-10 sheep and between 20 to 40 indigenous chickens. Focus group participants stated that they sold 10% of the cattle and 20% of the shoats they owned in Yinthungu sub location; 20% of the cattle and 20% of the goats in Makindo Kisingo and Masimba sub-locations; and 40% of the cattle and 20% of the goats in Ithumula sub-location. Those who sold animals at the early stages of the drought were able to receive the normal market price (at about 30,000 shillings per head of cattle and 3,000 shillings per goat). But, the majority of the focus group stated selling animals in the midst of the drought for prices not exceeding 5,000 shillings per cattle and 1,500 shillings per goat and indigenous chickens for 300-500 shillings.

Since, at the same time, focus group members were complaining about the price offered by a government destocking program (at 8,000 shillings per head of cattle)[8], it is likely that communities received higher prices for livestock than what they admitted to this mission. Regardless, the readiness

[8] The Government sponsored destocking program purchased only 18 head of cattle in Ithumula sub-location and never materialized in the other sub-locations due to the low price offer and the rejection of communities to be paid three months after the purchase date.

of these communities to sell livestock when drought becomes imminent signifies the fact that agro-pastoralists raise livestock primarily for the market in contrast to pastoralists[9]. As a result, destocking interventions (commercial or slaughter) could easily be acceptable in agro-pastoral communities, at any phase of the drought cycle, compared to pastoralists although the former own fewer stock. These fundamental differences need somehow to be reflected in LEGS.

7.2 **Restocking**

Restocking was carried out in Lulu village in Samburu. Beneficiaries chose the animals brought for sale within their respective areas, which were screened by the DLPO. Each goat was bought for 1,500 shillings. Sellers confirmed that the price they offered was reasonable. The program was cost-effective, because animals were bought locally (meaning from better off-households) to ensure adaptation and eliminate transport and other logistic costs.

Beneficiaries were selected on the following criteria: destitute families owning 1 to 3 goats; disabled people; families looking after orphans and poor people with children in high school (because of the school fees). Twenty three households (eight of them, female headed) were restocked with 10 goats each (1 male and 9 females) through a voucher scheme. The size of the operation too was small-scale to have any negative impact on the local market.

Herd viability was questionable given that households only owning 1-3 goats (which should not even qualify as beneficiaries by LEGS standards) were given additional 10 goats through the program. But, focus group interviewees were unyieldingly insistent in stating that the ten goats received will go a long way in making households viable since they complement income from other non-livestock sources, namely, from selling herbs (*seketet*), firewood, tobacco and *managu* (locally popular wild vegetable). In other words, household income in Lulu village is not entirely dependent on livestock and this fact holds true for many pastoralists in the region (see Little, 2009[10], Aklilu & Catley 2009[11]). Two interesting issues emerge at this point for consideration in the LEGS guideline, which are described in section 10 of this report.

Purchased animals were not de-wormed immediately on the assumption that they were covered in a previous program. However, the animals were not vaccinated either because of the sudden switch from destocking to restocking and the unavailability of vaccines. Long-term veterinary care (as in the LEGS guideline), cannot be guaranteed for restocked households or others, since the delivery of veterinary services in this or other pastoral areas in the region is minimal.

There were no criteria for sellers since buyers had to choose suitable animals from those offered for sale. As a result, some households benefitted more by selling as many as four goats to the program, while others sold one or what they brought for sale was rejected. This implies that those who offer healthy breeding stocks in the market benefit more in restocking operations and there is not much that can be done about it in terms of fairness.

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[9] Of note, these communities buy immatures from Garissa market for sale at profit after value adding.

[10] Little, P.D. (2009). *Income Diversification among Pastoralists: Lessons for Policy Makers*. Policy Brief Number 2 COMESA and Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) Program, Tufts University, Medford, MA.

[11] Aklilu & Catley, (2009). Livestock Exports from Pastoralist Areas: An Analysis of Benefits by Wealth Groups, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University

The operation took place at the right time at the recovery phase of the drought cycle, after the rains started.

7.3 *Animal and public health provision*

7.3.1 *Animal health*

Animal health intervention was carried out in all the five districts involving vaccinations and de-worming and the provision of multivitamins and some minor treatments.

Garissa and East Pokot (Chemolingot) districts
Initial assessment of needs was based on field reports on actual outbreaks of CCPP and Peste de petit ruminant (PPR) in Chemolingot and also in Garissa districts including the need for de-wormers and other treatments given the susceptibility of drought stricken animals to internal parasites. The request for the supply of RVF vaccines, on the other hand, was made by the Government to FAO on *El Nino* prediction.

Outside of the government veterinary service providers, the analysis of other service providers was made on assumptions rather than the reality on the ground in spite of the expectation that NGOs based in the area should have known such facts. For example, a voucher scheme was planned for the distribution of drugs in Garissa on an assumption that there were twelve private service providers (Agro-vet shops). In actual fact, there were only three service providers located in Garissa town and unable to provide such services to pastoralists far away.

Similarly, although hundreds of CAHWs were trained in the district in the past, only 26 CAHWs were found to be active in Garissa and only 6 in Samburu. There are 21 CAHWs in Chemolingot East Pokot district but most are found in Akoret location (some three hours away from Chemolingot) where no vaccination or treatment took place. On the other hand, there were no trained CAHWs in Kostei (Chemolingot) where vaccination and treatments were carried out. As a result, animal health interventions were largely carried out by staff from the district DVO with the involvement of only few CAHWs.

It appears that the involvement of CAHWs even in such emergency mass campaigns seems to be rather limited for a number of reasons. The non-recognition of CAHWs by the veterinary system in Kenya contributes to the sidelining of CAHWs in times of mass campaigns or treatments which erodes their confidence and pushes them to look for jobs elsewhere. CAHWs remain idle in normal times either because they don't get constant supplies of drugs or pastoralists buy drugs directly from suppliers when they go to towns according to the DVOs of Samburu and Garissa. Most CAHWs were initially selected for training on the basis of attaining Form 4 education and their educational status tempts them to go and look for job elsewhere when they become idle in their home areas. Despite this fact, the further training of CAHWs by NGOs seems to continue unabated. Meanwhile, it is tempting to suggest reviewing the selection criteria on educational levels for CAHWs. People with lower or even no formal education background may be more committed to staying in their home areas than those who have attained Form 4 education level for obvious reasons, as was the case in South Sudan.

At the request of the Government, FAO supplied some 800,000 doses of RVF vaccines. In Garissa, the vaccination took place on time but communities in one village (Raya) stated that they were neither

consulted nor informed what the RVF vaccine was for, during vaccination. Communities in a neighbouring village (Doloi Midi) stated that their livestock were not vaccinated at all. This implies that coverage may not have been adequate to protect the minimum herd level, given the proximity of the two villages along the same eco-system.

Otherwise, service design was based on addressing priority livestock health problems. De-worming and treatments for abscess, heart water, wounds and pneumonia were carried out in all the three districts. In Samburu, some 41,000 shoats were de-wormed and additional 2,000 shoats were treated for various ailments, covering 35% of the shoats population in the district, according to the DVO in Samburu[12]. Treatment was free, given the impact of the prolonged drought. Six CAHWs[13] were involved in Samburu in treating animals receiving an allowance of 1,200 shillings per day. In Chemolingot, 10,300 doses of CCPP vaccines were made available and a total of 12,291 animals were vaccinated including PPR. Treatments were also given for 2,269 animals for Mange, de-worming, ectoparasites, abscesses and skin diseases belonging to 667 families.

On the other hand, there was a considerable delay in the supply of vaccines and drugs owing to the lengthy FAO procurement practices, even after agreements were signed with implementing partners. In one particular case, there was a mix up in the delivery of vaccines. Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia (CBPP) vaccines were sent to Chemolingot where CCPP vaccines were required and it took a while to get the right vaccines.

In Chemolingot, vulnerable households were identified by the Chief to qualify for receiving free services. Others were told to buy such services from the private sector (where there were none). In the other areas, treatment services were provided on the basis of available drugs to those who happened to be there at the right time.

In all cases, treatment drugs were in short supply compared to actual needs and many pastoralists who missed out in the first round were asking if more drugs could be available during the missions' field visit. Generally, the effectiveness of de-wormers and other treatment drugs are highly appreciated and pastoralists attribute body weight gains after the rains not only to availability of pasture but also to the treatment. On the other hand, pastoralists not only have reservations about the effectiveness of vaccinations in times of drought but also claim to be the cause of sweating, dehydration, abortion and infertility. This attitude of pastoralists is well known by the DVOs in Garissa, Samburu and Chemolingot but they don't seem to bother to consult and obtain consent of the community they intend to serve during vaccinations. The only vaccine that was appreciated by pastoralists was CCPP in Chemolingot, since 'it stopped the coughing in shoats', according to the focus group interviewed at Kostei. Although the body condition of shoats has generally improved in Kostei since the rains, the focus group stated that the improvement was better in those shoats which were not only vaccinated but also de-wormed compared to those which were only vaccinated.

The FAO intervention was intended to avail supplementary funding to underfunded areas. Obviously, the animal health intervention took place at the late stage of the drought cycle, particularly for PPR and CCPP vaccinations. Even then, the vaccination was helpful for reducing mortality of herds

[12] This figure (35%) needs to be treated with caution, since it implies that there are only some 120,000 shoats in Samburu.
[13] Of 18 CAHWs in the district, only 6 remain active. Others have left their jobs.

because it coincided with the rains that followed soon. The RVF vaccination, instigated by the request of the Government, was done in a timely manner whether the *El Nino* prediction was right or wrong.

Makueni and Kitui districts
The target groups in these districts are predominantly agro-pastoral communities owning 5-10 head of cattle, 20-40 goats and 3-10 sheep and up to 40 indigenous chickens per household. Makueni and Kitui districts, along with others, were one of the drought stricken areas in 2009, where focus group participants claimed to have lost some 30 to 70% of the cattle population and 40% of the goats to the drought.

Initial planning meeting on the proposed animal health interventions for the two districts was carried out between FAO, VEA and the DVOs in September 2009 in Nairobi. A second planning meeting consisting of the VEA, DVOs and the four team leaders was held in Machakos on 2nd December 2009. The DVO and the team leaders then held an operational planning meeting on 14 January 2010, in which they identified operational areas and assessed available manpower for the operation, following which 20 CAHWs were given refresher courses. Meanwhile, back on the 5th of September, 2009 a Terms of Agreement was reached between VEA and FAO following which a Letter of Agreement was signed between the two parties on 21st October, 2009. However, the district only received the first batch of inputs (equipment, drugs, vaccines and vitamins) from FAO on 2nd March, after a lapse of some *six months* since the Letter of Agreement was signed. The first phase of the operation began a *month and a half later* on 27th April, after the inputs have arrived, and completed on 18th of May 2010. The mission was told that the second phase of the operation will begin soon.

The following activities were carried out in the first phase of the operation:

Greater Makueni district

16,146 cattle were vaccinated for Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) and Black Quarter (BQ) and also de-wormed;
28,162 goats and 8,109 sheep were vaccinated for CCPP and PPR, treated and de-wormed;
1,945 donkeys were de-wormed and 1,359 dogs were vaccinated for rabies[14]. Vector control was also carried out by using pour-on chemicals to thwart mosquitoes.

Greater Kitui district

5,158 head of cattle were vaccinated against LSD and BQ, de-wormed and given multivitamins;
1,007 dogs were vaccinated against rabies;
8,300 goats and 233 sheep were vaccinated against CCPP and PPR, de-wormed and provided with multivitamins;
1,130 donkeys were also de-wormed and given multivitamins.

The interventions in these districts were acclaimed by all focus group participants. This was because the animals have recovered by the time the operation began to positively respond to the vaccines and drugs mainly as a result of the delay in the delivery of inputs rather than by design. It also took nearly a month and a half for the DVOs to launch operation after the arrival of the inputs. This operation could only be considered as a *post-disaster* intervention rather than as an emergency one. Complaints were limited to shortage of drugs and vaccines.

[14] Rabies is an endemic disease in the region.

However small it was, communities were also required to contribute in cost sharing (perhaps because of the fact that communities were in the recovery process when the operation took place). Focus group participants confirmed that what they had to contribute was a reasonable amount relative to what private service providers charge. In total, some 244,971 shillings was collected from the first phase of the cost recovery process and deposited in a special account managed by the DSG.

FAO is keen to use this money for the second phase of the operation because of accountability. But, the DVOs informed the mission that the DSG's position is to keep the money plus the one to be collected from the second operation for future emergency use. The DSG's position seems to make sense because even if the money collected from the first operation is used for the second operation there is no way of immediately using the money to be raised from the second operation except depositing it in the bank. However, the DSG has to provide some assurance to account to FAO when the money is put in use in the future to move this process forward.

CAHWs were effectively used in this operation after 20 of them were given refresher courses. Each CAHW was paid 500 shillings per day for the course of the operation. More interestingly, the DVOs in the two greater districts (plus 2 other DVOs met in the newly formed districts) are quite unyielding in their stance that CAHWs are an integral part of the veterinary service delivery system in their operational areas. They point to the fact that a DVO and two animal health assistants[15] (AHA) assigned in each district cannot cover the workload without the support of CAHWs. The DVOs insist that CAHWs play a critical role in disease surveillance and reporting apart from veterinary service provision. For example, they recently reported to the DVO in Makueni about a potential outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). The DVOs added that CAHWs are the only means of administering Newcastle disease vaccines to indigenous chickens when they roost in individual households (either in early morning or the evening) as this cannot be done by DVOs or AHAs who live at some distance from communities. They dismiss the non-recognition of CAHWs in higher circles as 'pure Kabete politics'. It also appears that communities in the two districts invariably employ the services of CAHWs in normal times.

The design of this operation saw the vaccination of dogs for rabies and the treatment of donkeys through de-worming. The focus on rabies, a common disease in the area, demonstrates the importance of considering zoonotic diseases in emergency operations as specified in the LEGS guideline. Donkeys are critically important in pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood systems but they are often left out in emergency veterinary interventions - the focus being on cattle, sheep and goats and to some extent camels. Of the four FAO-funded veterinary interventions, due attention was given to donkeys only in these two agro-pastoral districts. They were largely ignored in the other pastoral areas.

It appears that in the two districts, women's direct income by and large is dependent on raising indigenous chickens (men make the decision to sell shoats and cattle). This region is famous for its' indigenous chickens which fetch higher prices than exotic breeds. However, the prevalence of New Castle, Coccidiosis and chicken Pox and infectious bronchitis, particularly in times of drought, incurs significant losses to women. As requested by women participants during the focus group discussion, the inclusion of poultry drugs and vaccines need to be reviewed in LEGS specifically in agro-pastoral settings including poultry restocking programmes for vulnerable women groups.

[15] The AHAs primary task is meat inspection in local slaughterhouses which limits their full participation in veterinary service provisions.

7.3.2 *Public health: carcass disposal*

The carcass disposal operation in Chemolingot was initiated on November 11, 2010, when the rains started because of the fear that carcasses could get washed to water points, according to the DPHO, who played a lead role in sensitizing people along with the Chief in the area. In fact, a cholera outbreak took place in the area between late November and December 2009. Communities were sensitized on the benefits of disposing carcasses that, if they contaminated water, could be the potential cause for typhoid, diarrhoea and nuisance (because people could not drink water that smells) and a breeding ground for flies that cause eye infection and food poisoning, among other things. The sensitization campaign also warned people from being tempted to eat dead animals because of hunger, as this was the normal practice amongst Pokot pastoralists. According to the DPHO and the Chief, this was the first sensitization exercise in the district.

Carcass disposal was carried out in ten sites around water pans, the main source of water in Ngiyang, Chemolingot. In total, only 76 cattle and shoats carcasses were disposed. One hundred twenty people were employed (for 200 shillings each) to dig holes, remove and bury the carcasses. Aqua tabs were distributed to those disposing carcasses, as a precautionary measure to protect them from drinking contaminated water. However, the process of digging, dragging and burying carcasses was a daunting task taking almost two hours to dispose a head of cattle. As it was difficult to remove carcasses in inaccessible areas, the effort of this initiative was totally focused on protecting water points. Water sites were selected because animals often die after reaching water points due to a combination of factors: (i) shock (taking too much water more than the body can cope with); (ii) being stuck in the mud and succumbing to death; and (iii) because of contaminated water.

The community at Kostei, where carcass disposal took place, confirmed to the mission that they were suffering from diarrhoea, vomiting, eye infection, etc, when the area was littered with decomposing carcasses and that the sensitization has made them aware of the potential causes of their suffering. They added that from now on they will stop the practice of consuming meat from carcasses dying of natural causes and that they have already began disposing carcasses on their own initiative. In fact, two young men, who have disposed seven goat carcasses on their own, were identified from the focus group to the mission. An elderly man in the focus group also stated that, 'as the oldest man in the community, I have the power to tell people what to do and I will keep on telling them to bury carcasses in as long as I am alive'.

The impact of this intervention was too visible in informing and persuading the community to take its own initiative. However, alternative methods should be sought for simplified ways of disposing carcasses (burning with Kerosene, industrial oil, etc) than the daunting task of burying them.

Box 1. A rare example of preparedness in Doloi Midi Village

Doloi Midi village is located some 30 km North of Garissa town along the Tana River. Residents of this village were former pastoralists who turned into agro-pastoralism some 14 years ago because of the depletion of their livestock assets. The community consists of 85 households and is led by a chairman. Farmland is owned communally but individually managed. The community farms vegetables (tomato, peppers), legumes (cow peas, green grams, beans) fruit trees (banana, mangoes, zeituns, avocado), and also produces fodder and sugarcane. This community was supported by Danish Development Agency (DANIDA) at the initial stage with an irrigation pump, which is not operating at the moment. Additional two pumps were obtained from ALRMP through cost sharing (communities contributing 440,000 KSH and ALRMP 1.2 million), which the community depends on at the moment. Some members of these former pastoralists were trained by the agricultural college in Garissa and were also assisted with fruit seedlings and seeds at the initial stage. The community also raises livestock, mainly shoats, but also some cattle and few camels. Number of shoats owned by households vary from 70-80 to 20-30.

The community raises most of their income from selling tomatoes to Garissa town, although the selling price ranges between 50 and 5 shillings per KG depending on the season. Additional income is raised from selling fruits from matured trees (half the trees are too young to produce fruits). The community also practices fattening by buying emaciated animals in times of drought from Garissa market including dairy cows for milk production. All children in the community attend school (which means school fees are paid on time) and two additional school rooms are being built to raise the status of the school from class 2 to class 4.

This community has not received any kind of emergency assistance except the occasional food aid from the Kenya Red Cross, which they stated they can do without. For example, at the time of the mission's visit, they have not received food aid for 2 months. They have also not been assisted with any kind of livestock-based intervention unlike the community in Raya Village, also settled along the Tana River, some 10 KM away. The Doloi Midi community is not even aware of the vaccination campaign that was conducted in their neighborhood in the recent drought. Yet they did not experience any livestock mortality throughout the drought. How did they do it?

They stated that they were prepared for the drought. They harvested grass from the irrigation spillovers and prepared hay; Napier grass and crop stalks were stocked; banana leaves and acacia pods were also used for feeding livestock during the prolonged drought. In addition, they also supported fellow pastoralists who came for help with livestock feed and some tomatoes.

Community members expressed they face two major problems. The first is that the depth of the water in the river is receding and is exposing them to crocodiles whenever they try to lower the foot valves of the irrigation pumps (two people were eaten by crocodiles) into the Tana River. They, therefore, require assistance to enable them pump water from an adjacent well rather than directly from the river. The second problem is the canals they channel the water through are not designed properly and they would like to receive technical assistance to rectify this problem. Meanwhile, they are not interested in any relief aid.

What makes them so different from the neighboring agro-pastoral community at Raya village that also uses the Tana River for irrigation? The community at Raya has been assisted with food aid, animal health intervention and destocking and yet they are insisting on receiving additional relief support. Obviously, community spirit, organizational set up and far-sighted leadership must have helped the Doloi Midi community to survive intact throughout the prolonged drought, unlike the community at Raya. A specific study of the two communities could unravel why they are performing differently and yet located in close proximity to each other.

8 Community perspectives on benefits derived

Focus group discussions led to the ranking of benefits derived, from the perspectives of communities, including shortcomings of the interventions. By and large, communities stated that the shortcomings of the interventions were related to the inadequacy of the support they received to cover most needs and that the support was provided too late in the drought cycle (particularly for destocking and animal health in the pastoral districts). In addition, communities in Garissa complained about the vaccination of their animals, which they were not informed about what it was for.

8.1 *Destocking*

Raya agro-pastoral group (Garissa)

- Money earned from selling goats was mostly spent on school fees (school fees range from 550 to 1,200 shillings per term). Thirty dropout children (who could not pay fees) were returned to school;
- Money spent on purchase of diesel for irrigation pumps (this is an agro-pastoralist community growing crops through pump irrigation along the Tana River);
- Purchase of food and clothes was ranked third;
- The meat was a welcome relief from the otherwise monotonous diet, but did not last more than a day as a goat was divided between 3-4 households;
- The destocking purchase price enabled them to earn about 500 shillings more than the market price;

Lulu (Samburu)

- Communities were able to sell goats at more than the market price in a depressed market situation;
- Most beneficiaries spent money on buying food;
- Money was also spent on school fees and text books and in two cases to pay hospital bills;
- Money earned allowed mothers to stay at home instead of going to the bush to collect fire wood for sale;
- Because of the money we received 'the trees were saved from being chopped down for sale' for at least one week[16];
- Lactating mothers benefitted from better diet containing meat, which when mixed with traditional herbs made sick people feel better (the meat distributed in Samburu lasted for a week);

8.2 *Restocking* (Lulu, Samburu)

- It raised hopes for the future and changed the status of poor pastoralists from *Troboli* (ruined pastoralist) to that of *Parakoni* (someone with a future);
- Restocking allowed children (that were hired by better-off households in distant places) to be reunited with their families and look after the family herd;

[16] The Samburus are very close to nature and the use of traditional herbs and vegetables from the forest is a common practice. This statement verifies their reverence to the forest despite circumstances forcing them to collect firewood for sale to survive.

- Those who sold four or more goats to the program were able to purchase cows to provide milk for their children;

8.3 Animal Health

Pastoral areas (Garissa, Samburu and East Pokot districts)

- The de-worming operation was highly attributed by pastoralists for the fast recovery of animals after the rains;
- CCPP vaccine was also considered highly for reducing mortality levels in Chemolingot;

Agro Pastoral areas (Makueni and Kitui districts)

- Marked improvement in body condition making animals marketable, which helped to pay for school fees and purchase of food
- Increased milk production
- Increased productivity of goats (more kids after vaccination and treatment)
- Reduction in Rabies cases
- Recovery of donkeys

8.4 Carcass disposal

- The sensitization program was fully understood and accepted by pastoralists;
- Visible reductions in vomiting and diarrhoea cases;
- Communities have vowed to stop the practice of consuming meat from unhealthy carcasses;
- Community members have already taken own initiative in disposing carcasses;

9 The application of LEGS

According to field officers of the partner agencies (VSF-Belgium and CODES) they have used the LEGS guideline to some extent both in the design and implementation phases of the interventions[17]. They perceive LEGS as an essential manual for field practitioners although most of them are not yet trained on LEGS and are not conversant with the details. Both VSF-Belgium and CODES field officers stated using hard copies downloaded from the web.

Field assessments support the application of LEGS (by default or intent), although adherence to the standards and guidelines vary from one intervention to another. In destocking operations, LEGS was firmly applied:

- in adhering to social and cultural norms; the identification of beneficiaries;
- the involvement of communities in slaughtering and meat distribution activities;
- meat inspection arrangements;
- direct payment modalities; and,
- disposal of skins and coordination with relevant agencies and so on.

[17] Many field officers are forced to use LEGS printouts from the web, which is not convenient in field situations. Local NGOs, in particular, seem to be more inconvenienced as a result of having no copies of the handy LEGS books.

The restocking operation was also in line with the LEGS guidelines except in the selection of beneficiaries who could have been considered as exiting from the pastoral mode of production if 'viability' is measured in terms of household income coming from livestock production alone. However, field realities (community decision) have forced the implementing agency (CODES) to opt for the poorest members of the group to benefit (those owning between 1 and 3 shoats). This makes perfect sense as, in this community, income from livestock is viewed as complementing income from other sources than the vice versa. Otherwise, beneficiaries were given the rare chance of choosing the animals they wanted from those offered for sale and those who sold animals to the program were paid through a coupon system. What was missing was the non-vaccination of animals purchased for restocking purposes as per the LEGS standards. In addition to the above, agencies offered purchase prices which were slightly higher than the prevailing market prices, whilst the LEGS guidelines advise against practices that could distort market prices, it was concluded that in this instance, the intervention was on too small a scale to have any distorting impact on market prices. The involvement of DSGs in assessment and planning and DLPOs and DPHOs in the operation phase indicates that the coordination process between relevant agencies was handled in accordance with LEGS.

The carcass disposal operation was preceded by an effective sensitization program that not only made people aware of the potential risks on their health status but also persuaded them to take actions on their own initiative, once they realized the benefits of the intervention. This was made possible through a successful partnership between the implementing agency and the DPHO. The procedures employed in this operation strictly adhere to the LEGS guideline on the need to effectively communicate with communities when planning the control of epizootic and other potential diseases caused in such circumstances.

The assessment and implementation modalities of animal health provision conformed less to LEGS compared to the other interventions. Services were admittedly designed to address priority health problems based on field reports. The growing need for CCPP and PPR vaccines, de-wormers and other essential drugs in such circumstances is apparent to professionals in the field and the program was rightly designed to address these problems, whereas RVF vaccine was introduced on *El Nino* prediction. However, analysis of private and para-service providers was incomplete and in some cases lacking, resulting in the cancellation of the planned coupon-based delivery of drugs at least in one operational area. Lengthy procurement procedures also delayed the delivery of drugs and vaccines on time[18]. Social and cultural norms were not taken into account in the case of the RVF vaccination at least in one of the villages visited in Garissa district.

LEGS stipulates that emergency vaccinations should fall in line with national policies. In this regard, it is doubtful if there is a national vaccination policy in Kenya, since vaccinations take place mainly when top up funding becomes available from outside sources in times of emergencies. The lack of a national policy (and the means to implement it, even if there is one) is reflected in the lack of specific objectives of vaccination by disease – i.e., whether vaccination takes place to protect herds that are not yet infected by the outbreak (ring vaccination) or for the total prevention of herds. Given the small numbers of animals vaccinated in this operation, it is doubtful if any of the two objectives are met.

Meanwhile, a strong working partnership was observed between the implementing agencies and the relevant DVOs, who nearly did all the vaccination and treatment. Such co-operations fall in line with

[18] Despite the LEGS guideline to deliver provisions on time, delays in the delivery of such items are likely to occur even in the future due to standard procurement procedures in some organizations.

the LEGS guideline. However, it casts doubt on the proper selection of beneficiaries since treatments were given to those who happen to be there at the right time, with the exception of Chemolingot, where beneficiaries were selected by the Chief. Obviously, the animal health intervention was planned to be synchronised with feed and water provisions, but this has not materialized because of delays in the implementation of the latter two. Fortunately, the problem was solved by the rains that followed soon after.

In Kitui and Makueni districts, beneficiary selection was done by areas thought to be hard hit by the drought. Shortages of vaccines and drugs meant that some areas were left out from receiving such services. Regardless, those who received the services were highly appreciative of the interventions as the operation took place in post-disaster settings. Meanwhile, similar to Government employees in other areas, the DVOs and AHAs who implemented the operation in the two districts are not at all familiar with LEGS. This implies that employees of relevant government agencies (water, public health, animal production etc) are not familiar with LEGS, as well. At this stage, LEGS is known to a varying extent by NGOs operating in pastoral areas and not in Government circles. Obviously, most livestock-related emergency interventions are not likely to take place without the direct participation or supervision of the latter. This necessitates spreading the concept of LEGS to Government agencies.

Of note, the level of LEGS applications in these interventions should be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, the interventions were designed to support on-going projects in underfunded areas. As a result, adherence to LEGS was likely compromised by the urgency to implement the projects in the midst of a severe drought. Secondly, in spite of the situation, the interventions have pioneered in incorporating the various standards of LEGS to a reasonable extent. The use of LEGS has facilitated in streamlining project activities and in providing some lessons for future revisions.

10 Lessons for LEGS

10.1 *Restocking*

LEGS suggests that restocking operations must ensure that households are restocked with 'viable herd size'. This suggestion is made on the assumption that household income is entirely tied up to livestock production. However, as was the case in Samburu and other evidences elsewhere, pastoral household income is not entirely dependent on livestock, unless in very remote areas. In some cases, income from other sources could even be more or equivalent to income from livestock sources. This fact necessitates for restocking operations to consider income from non livestock sources as *the criteria* to determine the number of stock households should receive. Taking into account non-livestock income sources would enable a restocking program to be as flexible as possible both in terms of the numbers of stock to be given to recipient households and in the number of stock families should originally own to qualify as beneficiaries.

In Samburu, restocking beneficiaries owned only 1-3 shoats which could have disqualified them as potential dropouts. However, the community was united in stressing that these households would become viable with the additional 10 shoats as the income from livestock will complement income from other sources. The consideration of income from non-livestock sources is, therefore, important in the selection of types of beneficiaries and in determining the quantity of stock to be given to households[19].

[19] The Samburu experience needs some detailed evaluation

It should also be noted that, when purchasing animals for restocking operations, what matters is more is the availability of healthy breeding stocks, rather than the vulnerable status of the seller. As a result, the benefits derived from such transactions may be skewed towards those who offer such animals on demand. This fact needs to be stated in LEGS, to prevent complaints of bias.

10.2 ***Animal Health***

A section on appropriate procedures for carcass disposal, including safety measures for people to be involved, needs to be incorporated in veterinary public health standards. The section should also outline a simplified carcass removal procedure (rather than dragging and burying carcasses).

The issue of targeting in the treatment of animals needs some rethinking in times of stress. Suppose available drugs are adequate only to treating 31,000 shoats out of 100,000 in the community, belonging to 5,000 households. Targeting could be difficult when the screening involves thousands of households.

It would be helpful if a note is included for animal health professionals on the need to inform and get the consent of communities before embarking on vaccination campaigns to avoid resentment (see the RVF case in Raya) in times of stress.

The commitment of CAHWs to staying in their home areas is critically important in view of their diminishing numbers in search of jobs elsewhere. This fact necessitates reviewing the selection criteria based on commitment factors to staying in home areas rather than on level of education. This may not be the mandate of LEGS but making stakeholders aware of this problem could help. Relative to pastoral areas, it also appears that CAHWs in agro-pastoral settings are actively engaged in service provision due to relative access to drug supplies and the willingness of communities to pay for services. (e.g. Makueni and Kitui districts)

The non-recognition of CAHWs by the official policy is depriving pastoralists from receiving services from the former while making investments by agencies that train and equip CAHWs worthless. The critical roles of CAHWs in underserved areas - where the provision of veterinary services is inadequate and in some cases non-existent has been proved valuable in countries like Ethiopia and Sudan. Kenya's situation is no better than these two countries. FAO and AU-IBAR should reason with the authorities for the recognition of CAHWs in Kenya, with the support of DVOs such as those in Greater Makueni and Kitui districts.

10.3 ***Flexibility***

The LEGS participatory response identification matrix (PRIM) for both rapid and slow-onset emergencies is entirely focused on specifying appropriate types of technical interventions relevant to emergency phases and livelihood objectives. As such, it does not provide guidance on program flexibility requirements when needs shift due to changes in the weather. For example, the advent of rains may necessitate to making program changes from destocking to restocking, rehabilitation of boreholes instead of shallow wells, fodder production rather than livestock feed provision and so on. Agencies need to build in flexibility in program design, indicating potential alternative activities in cases of weather changes (for better or worse). This would minimize the need for obtaining approvals from funding agencies when the need becomes apparent. Program flexibility also needs to be incorporated in LEGS.

10.4 *Training of Government staff on LEGS*

The current training program of LEGS is mainly focused on NGOs, FAO, independent consultants and government staff to some extent on the assumption that the latter may not be released as trainers by their employers. This approach inadvertently restricts the diffusion of the LEGS principle within FAO and NGO circles in the short-term. The adoption and eventual application of LEGS, on the other hand, will have a better chance of success with the training of government employees in relevant agencies, as NGOs cannot implement emergency interventions without the consent and participation of government in most cases. More importantly, NGOs move in and out of operational areas at will for a number of reasons including funding availability which makes the sustained use of LEGS in a given geographical area questionable. This implies national level trainings (by FAO and other agencies) should focus on training government staff to bring governments on board and guarantee the application of LEGS (even if the funding comes from other sources).

10.5 **Variations in methodical approaches between pastoral and agro-pastoral settings**

Certain apparent differences between pastoral and agro-pastoral communities need to be stated in LEGS for considerations in both program design and implementation phases. By and large, agro-pastoral communities raise livestock to complement income from crop production, trade and other sources. They are also more market oriented and consider livestock as commodities to be disposed for profit. For example, most of the livestock exported from Sudan are supplied by agro-pastoralists in Kordofan and Darfur (Aklilu & Catley, 2009) and Akamba agro-pastoralists in Kenya purchase immature from Garissa for the main purpose of reconditioning and selling for profit (Aklilu, 2008[20]). Emergency intervention approaches should therefore take into account the purposes for which livestock are raised. For example, destocking operations (slaughter or commercial) could be readily acceptable in agro-pastoral communities because they are more market oriented. Similarly, agro-pastoral communities would be more willing to share intervention costs, because they are used to incurring costs in normal times (for feed, water, veterinary services, etc) in pursuit of profit. Women's assets in agro-pastoral communities are largely tied to raising chickens, which they dispose as they wish. Protecting the livelihoods of women in such cases equates to saving chicken assets through veterinary interventions.

10.6 **Attention to Donkeys, Camels and poultry**

The pastoral mode of production is dependent on mobility and mobility can't take place without donkeys or camels. Agro-pastoralists also depend largely on donkeys and camels to transport produces or other commodities. Donkeys and camels also double as alternative income sources through hire or by transporting marketable commodities to where they are needed. Ex-pastoralists also depend largely on donkeys or camels for their survival. Yet, donkeys and camels are considered less important than cattle or sheep or goats and often sidelined in emergency interventions – particularly when it comes to feed and veterinary service provisions and restocking. The indispensable roles of camels and donkeys need to be highlighted in LEGS to signify their importance in pastoral and agro-pastoral settings to be given the due attention they deserve in emergency operations. The importance of poultry in agro-pastoral households should also be recognized.

[20] Aklilu, Y (2008). Livestock Marketing in Kenya and Ethiopia: A Review of Policies and Practice, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University

10.7 Use of LEGS for evaluation

One of the objectives of this specific assessment is to see if the common and specific indicators in LEGS can be used for evaluation. In the annexes that follow, a 0 to 5 scale has been used for scoring (0 being the lowest and 5 being the highest in meeting the LEGS indicators). The scoring is subjective, with notes provided to justify the level of scoring for some indicators, and is subject to review by the parties involved (FAO Kenya, VSF Belgium, CODES and VWEA).

Meanwhile, it suffices to say that the LEGS indicators are too unwieldy for scoring purposes since there are too many indicators in both the common and specific standards. For example, there are 38 indicators in the common standards, and the specific standards number 25 for restocking, 17 each for veterinary and destocking standards to be scored against.

Secondly, the LEGS approach of using utmost standards often ignores local realities which make scoring difficult even in best circumstances. For example, the use of international standard abattoirs in destocking operations is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future in East African context. Similarly, the integration of non-livestock support, relief-development continuum and exit strategies could be beyond the capacity of implementing agencies both in terms of finance and mandate. Scoring also becomes difficult in cases where two or three agencies are involved in a single operation – since a decision taken by one partner affects the performance of the other/s, for example between the DVS and the partner agency, as in the case of the RVF vaccination in Garissa. The FAO lengthy procurement procedure is another case in point.

One apparent problem is the overlapping of similar indicators in both the common and specific standards (for example, participation, initial assessment, targeting etc). The next step should be harmonising such indicators to minimize their appearance in both standards. A more appropriate alternative is designing a simplified assessment template that reflects field realities.

Annex 1

TERMS OF AGREEMENT

1. Background.

In early 2009 the *Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards* (LEGS) were published as a set of international standards for improving the design, quality and impact of livestock interventions in humanitarian crises. The development of LEGS was overseen by a Steering Group comprising FAO, ICRC, African Union, VSF Europa and Tufts University. LEGS is linked to the Sphere project and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (the Sphere handbook).

One important use of LEGS is as a tool for the evaluation of livestock projects, and assessing the extent to which a particular agency and project followed the LEGS standards and guidelines. Such assessment can relate to the LEGS guidance on needs assessments, the LEGS common standards and the LEGS standards on specific interventions such as market support, veterinary care or livestock feed supplementation. Key questions include:
'Did the agency follow the LEGS standards and if not why not?
'*Did the use of LEGS lead to appropriate project design and implementation, and ultimately, relevant livelihoods benefits to targeted communities and households?'*
'What revisions to future editions of LEGS might be needed based on these findings?'

The pastoralist areas of northern and southern Kenya are frequently affected by drought and subject to humanitarian livestock interventions. Large-scale programs are often coordinated by FAO and this coordination mechanism provides an opportunity for a standardized and 'LEGS-based' evaluation system to be piloted with FAO and implementing partners.

2. Terms of Reference
Broad objective

To develop the use of LEGS as an evaluation tool for the assessment of emergency livestock projects.

2.1 Description of Activities/Services
The activities below assume that:

- when coordinating new emergency livestock programs and making grants to NGOs, FAO will use LEGS as a reference when evaluating NGO proposals. FAO will record how each proposal was assessed against LEGS, and for those proposals which are approved, make this information available to the Tufts researcher;
- as an agency which coordinates NGOs and awards grants, FAO has an institutionalized monitoring system, as do the NGO grant recipients and the donor which makes the primary award to FAO; these systems will be used by the program and will ensure measurement of project implementation by NGOs under FAO guidance and according to contracts between FAO and NGO grantees; as an independent third party, Tufts will not monitor NGO implementation on behalf of FAO; FAO and NGOs will make monitoring information available to Tufts.

With these points in mind, a senior researcher from Tufts (Yacob Aklilu) will conduct systematic evaluations of 8 specific emergency livestock interventions implemented under the FAO program. LEGS will be used as the criteria for evaluation. The evaluation will include a qualitative assessment of the extent to which both common and specific LEGS standards and guidelines were applied (depending on the intervention in question), supported by a simple scoring system for each relevant standard to be completed by the Tufts researcher, FAO staff, NGO program managers and NGO field staff. The Tufts researcher will comment on the likely impact of the interventions, but will conduct detailed or systematic impact assessments based on representatives samples or interviews with project beneficiaries.

This evaluation methodology is assumed to be a minimalist approach, but requires only 2-3 days field time per intervention plus local travel time (maximum 42 days), plus time for review of documents and write up.

2.2 Outputs

- Inception report on the foreseen activities to be submitted to FAO;
- Terminal report to be submitted to FAO including suggested revisions to future editions of LEGS based on these findings.

2.3 Duration and Timing.
The project will commence February 2010 and be complete by July 2010.

2.4 <u>Monitoring and Progress Reporting.</u>
The project will monitor the progress against CERF funded projects against the LEGS guidelines. VETWORKS UK will submit three reports to FAO as follows:

- An inception report detailing their work plan and travel arrangements
- A final report including suggested revisions to future editions of the LEGS as well as suggested improvements in project design.

3. Inputs to be provided free of charge by Recipient Organization.

Annex II

Measurement of Veterinary Care: General Standard

Indicators	VSF Belgium Garissa	Chemolingot	CODES Samburu	VWEA Makueni & Kitui
Rapid participatory assessment and prioritisation of veterinary needs is conducted involving all relevant subgroups within a disaster-affected population, and in partnership with local veterinary authorities and service providers, if present (see guidance note 1).	4	4	4	4
All existing veterinary service providers are mapped within the disaster-affected area and analysed in terms of current capacity, and potential capacity if assisted by aid agencies (see guidance note 2).	2	4	4	5
The assessment includes analysis of service providers before the disaster with regard to payment for services (see guidance note 2).	2	NA	NA	NA
The assessment includes a rapid analysis of policy or legal factors which may hinder or enable specific implementation strategies (see guidance note 3).	NA	NA	NA	NA
Overall score	3	4	4	4.5

Measurement of Veterinary Care: Primary Clinical Veterinary Services

Indicators	VSF Belgium Garissa	Chemolingot	CODES Samburu	VWEA Makueni & Kitui
The service design process follows on directly from the initial assessment, uses the information and analyses of the assessment, and is based on the active participation of the disaster-affected population, including vulnerable groups (see guidance note 1).	3	4	4	4
The design of the service includes specific elements to reach vulnerable groups and in particular addresses challenges of accessibility and affordability (see guidance note 2).	4	4	4	4
Service design considers the need for rapid procurement and availability of relevant veterinary vaccines and medicines, and the need for appropriate quality of products and proper storage at field level (see guidance note 3).	2	2	2	1
Service design includes provision of rapid training to local service providers as necessary (see guidance note 4).	0	0	0	4
Service design is based on local social and cultural norms, particularly in relation to gender roles (see guidance note 5).	3	3	3	3
Service design maximises the security of local people, veterinary				

service providers and aid agency staff (see guidance note 6).	NA	NA	NA	NA
The roles and responsibilities of all actors are clearly documented and where appropriate and necessary, form the basis of written agreements (see guidance note 7).	5	5	5	5
Overall score	3	3	3	3.5

Measurement of Veterinary Care: Veterinary Public Health (Rift Valley fever and Rabies vaccination)

Indicators	VSF –B Garissa	CODES Samburu	VWEA Makueni & Kitui
An assessment of zoonotic diseases and their prioritisation is included in the initial assessment of animal health problems (see guidance note 1).	4	NA	5
Zoonotic disease control measures are designed and implemented either in conjunction with the provision of clinical services, or as stand-alone activities (see guidance note 2).	4	NA	5
Overall score	4	NA	5

Measurement of Veterinary Care: Sanitation and food hygiene (in relation to slaughter destocking or carcass disposal)

Indicators	VSF Belgium Garissa	Chemolingot	CODES Samburu
Sick or injured animals requiring euthanasia are euthanized humanely and safely, and disposed of to ensure good hygiene (see guidance note 1).	NA	NA	NA
In protracted crises, slaughter slabs are constructed (see guidance note 2).	0	NA	0
Meat inspection procedures are established at slaughter slabs and abattoirs used by the disaster-affected population (see guidance note 2).	3	NA	3
Overall score	1.5	-	1.5

Notes: Although the service design considered the need for rapid procurement and availability of relevant veterinary vaccines and medicines, the procurement process was delayed due to FAO procedures. Meat inspection was carried out in both Garissa and Samburu, but slabs were not constructed. Service design did not specifically paid attention to gender needs in all cases.

Annex III
Measurement of Restocking: Standard 1 Assessment

Indicators	CODES
The role that livestock plays in livelihoods pre-disaster are analysed (see guidance note 1)	4
Indigenous mechanisms for community-based redistribution of livestock are assessed (see guidance note 2)	0
The social, physical and natural capital assets of target beneficiaries are considered, to assess their suitability as recipients (see guidance note 3)	4
The cost-effectiveness of livestock provision activities is assessed in comparison with other possible interventions, as well as any (external or internal) policy constraints (see guidance note 4)	4
The probable impact of the purchase of quantities of animals on (local) livestock markets is assessed (see guidance note 5)	4
Local norms for minimum viable herd size are assessed (see guidance note 6)	4
The environmental impact of the provision of livestock is assessed (see guidance note 7)	?
The potential risks to the welfare of livestock provided are assessed (see guidance note 8)	?
The risk of epizootic disease outbreak is assessed (see guidance note 9)	?
The security implications of the provision of livestock as assessed and livestock provision only takes place when the security of the stock and the beneficiary populations can be assured (see guidance note 10)	NA
Overall score	3.3

Measurement of Restocking: Standard 2 Definition of the package

Indicators	CODES
The design of livestock provision interventions takes account of indigenous systems of stock distribution (see guidance note 1)	0
Selection of beneficiaries is based on local participation and practice (see guidance note 2).	5
The type and quantity of livestock provided are appropriate to support livelihoods and are productive, healthy and adapted to local conditions (see guidance note 3)	5
Animals are distributed at appropriate times (see guidance note 4)	5
Overall score	4

Measurement of Restocking: Standard 3 Credit, procurement, transport & delivery

Indicators	CODES
Procurement is based on local purchase where possible (see guidance note 1)	5
Procurement takes place according to agreed criteria, and in accordance with legal procurement procedures (see guidance note 2)	5
Veterinary inspection takes place at the time of livestock purchase (see guidance note 3)	3
Livestock are provided under a credit system only when this increases beneficiary commitment and at the same time does not jeopardise the productivity of the livestock provided or the capacity of the household to meet	NA

their basic needs; in all other cases livestock are provided as a gift (see guidance note 4)	
Transport is planned in advance to minimise risk of losses in transit and based on conditions that ensure the well-being of the stock (see guidance note 5)	NA
Overall score	3.3

Measurement of Restocking: Standard 4 Additional support

Indicators	CODES
Preventative veterinary care is provided for the livestock prior to distribution (see guidance note 1)	2
A system for the ongoing provision of veterinary care is established for all members of the community (see guidance note 2)	0
Training and capacity building support is provided to beneficiaries based on an analysis of skills and knowledge of animal husbandry (see guidance note 3)	NA
Training and capacity building includes preparedness for future shocks and disasters (see guidance note 4)	NA
Food security needs are identified and met according to the Minimum Standards in Food Security, Nutrition and Food Aid (Sphere Handbook), in order to prevent early off-take of livestock (see guidance note 5)	NA
Shelter and non-food needs are similarly identified and met according to the Minimum Standards on Shelter, Settlement and Non-food Items (Sphere Handbook) (see guidance note 6)	NA
Food security support is withdrawn only when herd size and/or the emergence of other economic activities enable independence from such support (see guidance note 7)	NA
Overall score	1

Notes: Animals purchased were visually inspected but not immediately vaccinated, although they were assumed to be de-wormed in a previous programme. Provision of long-term veterinary care is beyond the capacity of the local implementing agency. The restocking process involved few numbers of ***locally purchased*** *animals to bring any environmental impact, epizootic and/ or animal welfare risks. However, such risks were not included in the assessment, whether the risks were there or not, which makes scoring difficult. The provision of food, shelter and other non-food items is beyond the scope of the implementing agency (CODES), which makes scoring difficult.*

Annex IV
Measurement of Slaughter Destocking: General Standard

Indicators	VSF Belgium	CODES
The phase of the emergency is carefully assessed (see guidance note 1)	3	3
Livestock condition and terms of trade are monitored (see guidance note 2)	?	?
Accelerated off-take is only considered during the Alert and early Alarm phases of an emergency, when private traders are willing to purchase livestock and stock condition is suitable for commercial sale (see guidance notes 1 and 2)	NA	NA
Destocking interventions are based on the selection of appropriate livestock species, age and types according to indigenous knowledge and practice (see guidance note 3)	5	5
The assessment takes into account the policy context, both external and internal (see guidance note 4)	NA	NA
The security situation does not present risks for transaction of business, animal owners and programme implementers (see guidance note 5)	5	5
Overall score	4	4

Measurement of Slaughter Destocking: Specific Standard

Indicators	VSF Belgium	CODES
Purchase sites and dates are determined through community participation (see guidance note 1)	5	5
Purchase price is determined for each species and payment methods are agreed upon (see guidance notes 2 and 3)	5	5
Beneficiary households are identified and in kind contributions are agreed with communities (see guidance note 4)	3	3
Possibilities for establishing and working with 'Meat Relief Committees' are examined (see guidance note 5)	5	NA
Selection of stock is based on the most appropriate animal types using indigenous knowledge (see guidance note 6)	4	5
Procurement methods are identified (see guidance note 7)	5	5
Decisions are reached on whether to distribute fresh or dry meat (see guidance note 8)	5	5
Slaughter, preparation and preservation methods are based on locally acceptable norms and address international standards (see guidance note 9)	3	3
There are no major epizootic and public health risks associated with slaughtering animals (see guidance note 10)	4	4
Disposal of hides and skins process is assessed (see guidance note 11)	5	5
Where other options are not possible, severely emaciated stock may be considered for slaughter disposal (see guidance note 12)	NA	NA
Overall score	4.4	4.4

Notes: In kind contributions were not agreed with communities and services provided were paid for on both sites; there were no 'meat relief committees' in Samburu; twenty carcasses, out of two hundred, were condemned in Garissa; slaughter, preparation and preservation methods did not address international standards and whether this could be achieved in the foreseeable future is questionable (the scoring for this indicator is based on LEGS standards and not on actual field realities).

Annex V

Measurement of Common Standards 1: Participation

Indicators	VSF Belgium			CODES			VWEA
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Animal health
Participation of vulnerable groups in assessment	5	3	5	5	3	5	3
Documentation of indigenous knowledge and pre-existing livestock services	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
Recognition of social or cultural norms	5	3	5	5	5	5	3
Dialogue around implementation options	5	2	5	5	2	5	4
Overall score	5	2.7	5	5	4.	5	4

Common Standard 1: Participation

- All specific sub-sets and vulnerable groups in a population are identified, informed that an assessment and possible intervention(s) will take place, and encouraged to participate in the assessment process (see guidance notes 1 and 2).
- Key indigenous livestock production and health knowledge and practices, and pre-existing livestock services are documented and used to ensure the sustainability of inputs (see guidance note 3).
- Interventions are based on an understanding of social and cultural norms (see guidance note 4).
- Provisional programme inputs and implementation approaches are discussed with community representatives and/or community groups representing the range of population sub-sets and vulnerabilities (see guidance note 5).

Notes: The DVS in Garissa did not even inform communities what the RVF vaccine was for let alone consulting them. Pre-existing livestock services (particularly of private vet services) were not properly documented in Garissa. Similarly, de-worming services were carried out in Samburu on the availability of drugs without consultation of communities, although the service was appreciated. Participation of vulnerable groups in Makueni and Kitui districts followed after beneficiary communities were selected by the DVOs on the assumption of hardest hit areas by drought. But, beneficiaries were not informed what the vaccines and drugs were for (excepting rabies, since communities know that dogs are vaccinated for rabies.)

Measurement of Common Standards 2: Initial Assessment

Indicators	VSF Belgium			CODES			VWEA
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Animal health
Systematic participatory inquiry using trained workers and triangulation	3	2	4	3	2	4	3
Findings disaggregated by populations subsets & vulnerable groups	4	3	4	4	3	5	3
Protection issues covered	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Strategy for involvement of local service providers defined, with exit strategy	4	3	NA	NA	4	NA	4
Possible policy or regulatory constraints identified	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Overall score	3.3	2.6	4	3.5	3	4.5	3.3

Common Standard 2: Initial Assessment

- The assessment covers the key topics outlined in Chapter 2, uses systematic, participatory inquiry conducted by trained workers; and triangulates findings with pre-existing technical data when available (see guidance note 1).
- Findings are disaggregated by population subsets and vulnerable groups.
- The assessment reviews the capacity of relevant authorities to protect populations in the territory under their control, and includes an analysis of the operational environment and the protection implications of different livestock interventions (see guidance note 2).
- The assessment clearly describes existing local service providers, explains if and how the interventions will work with these actors, and defines an exit strategy intended to maximize the sustained use of local services and markets (see guidance note 3).
- The assessment includes a rapid analysis of national policies and regulations which may prevent certain interventions, and reviews the capacity of local regulatory bodies to enforce official rules and regulations (see guidance note 4).

Notes: Participatory enquiries were limited in animal health cases because the vets did not see the need for it. Veterinary treatment services were provided to members of communities who happened to be there at the right time rather than on vulnerability basis,

because available drugs were not enough to treat all cases (targeting in such cases, can obviously be difficult when it involves the selection of hundreds or thousands of households). In Kitui and Makueni, selection was area-based. The relevant DVS staff were obviously involved as service providers to the exclusion of private ones for various reasons including shortcomings in the assessment phase. Exit strategies were not defined. There was no need of covering protection and policy issues. In Kitui and Makueni districts CAHWs were provided with refresher courses and subsequently employed for the operation. Disaggregation of vulnerable groups was done for destocking and restocking operations by communities. Pre-sensitization of communities was effective for the carcass disposal operation in Chemolingot.

Measurement of Common Standards 3: Response and Coordination

Indicators	VSF Belgium			CODES			VWEA
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Animal health
Livestock inputs don't hinder direct human life saving support	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Livestock interventions coordinated and harmonized	5	3	5		3	4	3
Agencies without livestock expertise invite livestock agencies in	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Integration of livestock inputs with non-livestock support	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Coordination of emergency and development initiatives	NA	3	NA	NA	3	5	3
Overall score	5	4	5	5	4	4.7	3.5

Common Standard 3: Response and Coordination

- Where people's lives are at risk, livestock interventions do not hinder life-saving humanitarian responses (see guidance note 1).
- Livestock interventions are coordinated to ensure harmonized approaches between agencies, and according to agreed implementation strategies (see guidance note 2).
- When an agency cannot conduct a livestock assessment or respond to livestock needs, it makes these deficits known to other agencies which may have the capacity for livestock responses (see guidance note 3).

- Where possible, livestock interventions are integrated with other types of humanitarian assistance to maximize impact and ensure efficient use of shared resources (see guidance note 4).
- Coordination is prioritised by all stakeholders, including the harmonisation of donor and government approaches, for both emergency response and longer term development initiatives (see guidance note 5).

Notes: Integration was constrained due to delays in water rehabilitation and feed provision / fodder production activities plus the lack of other non-livestock support. Emergency and development initiatives were integrated in the vaccination and treatment of animals (including carcass disposal) and particularly in the switch made from destocking to restocking. VWEA's involvement of CAHWs is considered as integrating emergency and development activities. Coordination with FAO was affected because of delays in the delivery of drugs but field-level coordination was good.

Measurement of Common Standards 4: Targeting

Indicators	VSF Belgium			CODES			VWEA
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Animal health
Targeting according to vulnerability, & criteria defined & disseminated	5	3	5	5	3	5	4
Targeting approach agreed with community	5	3	5	5	3	5	3
Overall score	5	3	5	5	3	5	3.5

Common Standard 4: Targeting

- Targeting criteria are based on an understanding of the actual or potential uses of livestock by vulnerable groups, and the criteria are clearly defined and widely disseminated (see guidance note 1).
- Targeting mechanisms and the actual selection of beneficiaries is agreed with communities, including representatives of vulnerable groups (see guidance note 2).

Notes: Targeting in animal health services was not strictly defined on vulnerability basis as in destocking, restocking and carcass disposal operations. Targeting in kitui and Makueni districts were area-based.

Measurement of Common Standards 5: Monitoring, Evaluation and Livelihoods Impact

Indicators	VSF Belgium			CODES			VWEA
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Animal health
Rapid, early set up of an M&E system	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
M&E is participatory	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Frequency of monitoring is appropriate	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
Monitoring uses both process and impact indicators	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Evaluation is conducted	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Livelihoods impact is assessed	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Coordination body has programme-wide M&E system	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
M&E facilitates learning	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Overall score	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Common Standard 5: Monitoring, Evaluation and Livelihoods Impact

- A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is established as soon as possible during implementation (see guidance note 1)
- M&E systems are based on participation by the beneficiary communities as much as is feasible and appropriate (see guidance note 2)
- Monitoring is conducted with sufficient frequency to enable rapid detection of required changes and modification of implementation (see guidance note 3).
- The monitoring system combines both technical progress indicators, and impact indicators identified by beneficiaries; impact indicators are measured by beneficiaries working with agency staff (see guidance note 4).
- An evaluation is conducted with reference to the stated objectives of the project, and combines measurement of technical indicators and community-defined indicators (see guidance note 4).
- Impact is assessed according to changes in the livelihoods of the affected communities (see guidance note 5)
- When multiple agencies are involved in livestock interventions, M&E systems are standardised to allow programme-wide progress and impact to be measured; M&E reports are shared with all relevant actors, including community groups and coordination bodies (see guidance note 6).
- M&E systems facilitate learning by all stakeholders (see guidance note 7)

Note: Monitoring and evaluation activities were incorporated at the planning phase by FAO.

Measurement of Common Standards 6: Technical Support and Agency Competencies

Indicators	VSF Belgium			CODES			VWEA
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Animal health
Livestock workers have both technical knowledge & participatory skills	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Livestock workers are familiar with human rights & humanitarian principles	?			?			?
Livestock workers are familiar with livelihoods-based programming	5			3			3
Overall score	5	5	5	4	4	4	4

Common Standard 6: Technical Support and Agency Competencies

- Livestock workers possess relevant technical qualifications, and the knowledge and skills to conduct rapid participatory assessments and joint planning of interventions with all relevant population subsets and vulnerable groups (see guidance note 1).
- Livestock workers are familiar with human rights and humanitarian principles, and their relevance to livestock interventions (see guidance note 2).
- Livestock workers are familiar with the principles of livelihoods-based programming (see guidance note 2).

Notes: The level of familiarity with human rights issues becomes difficult to establish although humanitarian principles are understood to a reasonable extent by staff of the agencies. As a result, the row has been excluded from the overall score in the table.

Measurement of Common Standards 7: Preparedness

Indicators	VSF Belgium	CODES
Use of DRR		
Reviews of disasters		
Contingency plans & triggers		
CP anticipates admin & procurement issues		
For drought, the CP uses drought cycle management		
Community preparedness		
Overall score		

Common Standard 7: Preparedness

- Disaster risk reduction (DRR) informs and forms part of agencies' emergency planning and implementation (see guidance note 1)
- Agencies with long-term development programmes conduct regular reviews of past disasters in their operational area with regard to the type of disaster, frequency, severity and lessons learnt from disaster response, if any (see guidance note 2).
- Based on this information, agencies develop contingency disaster plans with clearly-defined triggers for action and the subsequent release of funds and other resources (see guidance note 2).
- Contingency plans take into account the agency's procurement and administrative procedures and any obstacles to potential future emergency responses are addressed (see guidance note 3)
- Contingency plans for drought are based on the principles of drought cycle management and early response, with appropriate sequencing of interventions (see guidance note 4).
- Communities are encouraged to prepare for future emergencies (both rapid and slow onset) (see guidance note 5)
- All emergency intervention plans are accompanied by an exit strategy which links with post-disaster recovery and long-term support to livelihoods (see guidance note 6)

Notes: No scoring has been made for this table as the interventions under review were intended to support on-going projects in underserved areas.

Measurement of Common Standards 8: Advocacy and Policy

Indicators	VSF Belgium					CODES			
	Destocking	Animal health	Carcass disposal	Water provision	Feed provision	Destocking	Animal health	Restocking	Fodder production
Policy constraints identified		*					*		
Policy constraints are addressed									
Policy analysis & action respond to vulnerability									
M&E provides evidence for policy dialogue									
Overall score									

Common Standard 8: Advocacy and Policy

- Policy constraints affecting the protection, use or rebuilding of livestock assets are identified (see guidance note 1)
- In coordination with other stakeholders, and as appropriate in the context, policy constraints are addressed through advocacy or other activities at the relevant (local, national, regional, international) level (see guidance note 2)
- Policy analysis and action considers the underlying causes of vulnerability to disaster (see guidance note 3)
- Monitoring and evaluation systems provide evidence which contributes directly to policy dialogue and advocacy (see guidance note 4)

Notes: No other policy constraints were identified in the interventions under review except in the non-recognition of CAHWs by the official veterinary system. The implementing partners are in no position to address the specific constraint on their own.

Annex VI

Itinerary

7/3/2010	Arrived in Nairobi
8/3/2010	Discussion with FAO staff in Nairobi, selection of sites to be visited
9/3/2010	Travelled to Garissa
10/03/2010	Discussion with VSFB staff in Garissa, focus group discussion with Raya beneficiary community
11/03/2010	Focus group discussion with Doloi Midi community followed by meetings with the DMO, DLPO and DVS
12/03/2010	Left Garissa, overnight at Nyahururu
13/03/2010	Arrived in Maralal, meeting with CODES staff
14/03/2010	Focus group discussion with Lulu community
15/03/2010	Meetings with DLPO, DVS and DMO (Marsabit)
16/03/2010	Left Maralal, overnight at Chemolingot
17/03/2010	East Pokot, meeting with VSFB staff, DPHO, focus group discussion with Kostei community
18/03/2010	Returned to Nairobi
19 -21/03/2010	Nairobi
22/03/2010	Nairobi, meeting with VSFB and Vetworks East Africa country directors
23/03/2010	Debriefing at FAO Nairobi, and return to Addis
21/06/2010	Arrived in Nairobi and proceeded to Machakos
22/06/2010	Meetings with DVOs (in Makueni and Kathonzweni districts) and focus groups in Kithuki, Yinthungu and Makindu Kisingo locations
23/06/2010	Meeting with DVO (Mutomo district) and focus groups in Ithumula and Masimba sub-locations
24/06/2010	Meeting with DVO (Kitui district)
25/06/2010	Returned to Nairobi; debriefing by telephone
27/06/2010	Return to Addis